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8.1  Introduction 
The Progressive Era laid the groundwork for many modern economic regu- 
lations. To understand the origins of the progressive regulations we must recog- 
nize that the legislation often  involved a complex set of regulatory  proscrip- 
tions. To  say that a group categorically  favored one type of regulation  over 
another would be mistaken, because changes in key aspects of the proposed 
regulatory environment might have substantially altered its economic impact 
on the group. As a result, major battles were not always fought over regulation, 
per se, but over the particular form the legislation would take. Changes in the 
components of the regulation might have either slowed or sped its adoption, as 
the coalitions realigned based on their expected gains from the alternative pro- 
posals. 
The Progressives also pushed to give voters a greater voice in government 
policy through referenda that often changed the form and timing of regulation. 
Interest groups could form cohesive winning coalitions when decision making 
was limited to the legislature. If the laws also had to meet the approval of voters 
in a referendum, then the features of  the propositions had to change to win a 
broader constituency. The adoption process might have taken longer, not only 
because it required an extra step, but also because large numbers of voters may 
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have been concerned about the consequences of regulatory reform. In this pa- 
per we examine how the changing features of regulation and differences in the 
political decision-making process influenced the alignments and realignments 
of coalitions on one of the leading Progressive Era reforms, workers’ compen- 
sation laws. 
Workers’  compensation  marked a radical shift in the way  that employees 
were compensated for the medical expenses and wage losses that resulted from 
industrial accidents. Whereas accident benefits under negligence liability were 
quite unpredictable, under workers’ compensation all workers injured “out of 
or in the course of employment”  were compensated, with fault no longer an 
issue.’ Further, the average payments to injured workers under workers’ com- 
pensation were often substantially higher than the averages received by those 
receiving some positive amount under negligence liability. Moreover, the prob- 
ability of  being compensated was much higher under workers’ compensation 
than under negligence liability. For these reasons scholars have generally con- 
sidered  workers’  compensation  to  be the first instance  of  large-scale  social 
insurance  in the  United  States (Ely  1908; Eastman  1910; Conyngton  1917; 
Lubove 1967; Weinstein  1967). 
The laws were adopted rapidly across the United States in the 1910s. Within 
a decade forty-four states had adopted compensation legislation, and by  1930 
only Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina had yet to enact a law. 
As Harry Weiss (1966, 575) noted, “No other kind of labor legislation gained 
such general acceptance in so brief a period in this country.” 
Each state’s law varied with respect to the type of  industries and workers 
that were covered, maximum and minimum payouts for lost wages and death, 
the timing of the payments, the coverage of medical expenses, the number of 
waiting days before benefits would commence, what organizations would pro- 
vide the insurance, and what legal body would adjudicate conflicts within the 
system. Table 8.1 lists several key aspects of each state’s law in the order in 
which they were enacted. The benefit index is the ratio of the present value of 
death benefits (using a 10 percent discount rate) to average annual manufactur- 
ing earnings in the year the law passed. The ratio ranged from a low of 1.41 in 
Georgia to a high of 5.36 in Oregon. Some states compelled firms to join the 
workers’  compensation system, whereas  others allowed  firms to choose, al- 
though those that opted out ofthe system forfeited the three common law de- 
fenses under the traditional  negligence liability system. Some states required 
companies to insure through monopolistic state funds, others offered the op- 
tion of either a state fund or private insurance, and still other states relied exclu- 
sively on private  insurance carriers. The method  of  administration  varied as 
I. In many states, however, agriculture, domestic service. casual lahor. and public service were 
excludcd from the compensation laws. Sometimes specific industrics were excluded. For example, 
Maine  excluded  logging, Maryland  exempted  country  blacksmithh, and Texas excluded  cotton 
ginning. For a more comprehensive summary of  the exemptions across the United States, see BLS 
1918, 58. Table 8.1  Characteristics of Workers’ Compensation Laws in the United States 
Ratio of Benefits to  Compensation ElectiveKompulsory 
State  Year of  Enactment  Annual Earnings  (private employment)  Method of Insurance”  Method of  Administration 
CA  1911 
IL  1911 
KS  1911 
MA  1911 
NH  1911 
NJ  1911 
OH  1911 
WA  1911 
WI  1911 
MD‘  1912 
MI  1912 
R1  1912 
A2  1913 
CT  1913 
1A  1913 
MN  1913 
NE  1913 
NV  1913 
NY’  1913 
OR  1913 
TX  1913 
WV  1913 
LA  1914 
CO  1915 







































































































(continued) Table 8.1  (continued) 
Ratio of Benefits to  Compensation Elective/Compulsory 
State  Year of Enactment  Annual Earnings  (private employment)  Method of Insurance”  Method of Administration 
ME  1915 
MT  1915 
OK  191s 
PA  1915 
VT  191s 
WY  1915 
KY‘  1916 
DE  1917 
ID  1917 
NM  1917 
SD  1917 
UT  1917 
VA  1918 
AL  1919 
ND  1919 
TN  1919 
GA  1920 
MO  1925 
NC  1929 
FL  1935 
sc  1935 
AR  1939 




























































































Commission Sources: The details of the laws at the time of passage come from BLS 1917, 1918, 1921, 1926b, and the session laws of the states that 
passed workers’ compensation after 1930. For the years prior to 1927, the average weekly wage was calculated as average weekly hours 
times hourly earnings from Paul Douglas’s series (series D 765 times series D 766 in U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 168). For years 
after 1927, the average weekly wage is from the BLS series (US.  Bureau of the Census 1975, 169-70  series D 802). 
Noles: The ratio of benefits to annual earnings is calculated based on the national average weekly wage in manufacturing. Given the weekly 
earnings, we calculated the present value  of  the  stream of  payments allowed by  the  workers’ compensation  statute using continuous 
discounting and a discount rate of  10 percent. The worker was assumed to have had a wife aged 35 and two children aged 8 and 10. In 
some states, there was an overall maximum payment  that was binding. We assumed the families were paid the maximum weekly amount 
until the time that the maximum total payment (not discounted) was reached; therefore, time in the discounting formula in those states was 
equal to the maximum total payment divided by the weekly payment. In Nevada, New York, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia, the 
payments were  for the life of the spouse or until  remarriage. We assumed that the spouse lived thirty  more years without  remarrying. 
Payments to dependents were stopped when they reached the state’s defined age of adulthood. Finally, the present value of the stream of 
benefits was divided by annual earnings, which was defined as the average manufacturing weekly wage times fifty weeks. 
Competitive state insurance allowed employers to purchase their workers’ compensation insurance from either private insurance compa- 
nies or the state. A monopoly state fund required employers to purchase their policies  through the state’s fund. Most states also allowed 
firms to self-insure if they could meet certain financial solvency tests. 
hErnployees have option to collect compensation or sue for damages after injury. 
‘Maryland  (1902), New  York  (1910), Montana (1909), and Kentucky (1914) passed  earlier laws  that  were  declared unconstitutional. 
Maryland also passed a law specific to miners in  19 10, while New York passed an elective compensation law and a compulsory compensa- 
tion law in  1910. The compulsory law was declared unconstitutional, but was passed in 1913 after the state constitution was amended. 
“Compulsory for motor bus industry only. 
‘Compulsory for coal mining only. 
‘Oklahoma’s law pertained only to nonfatal accidents. Fatal accident compensation was handled according to the traditional  rules of negli- 
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well. Several states continued to rely upon the courts to resolve disputes be- 
tween workers  and employers,  although  most  states created commissions  to 
administer the program. 
Previous historical analyses,  some based  on state-level  case studies, have 
attempted to explain the adoption of workers’ compensation in different states, 
but they neglected to consider how the same interest-group pressures that de- 
termined the passage of the laws influenced the specific nature of the legisla- 
tion  ultimately  enacted.2 As  both  theoretical  (e.g.,  Stigler  197 1; Peltzman 
1976; Becker 1983) and empirical (e.g., Hughes 1977; Olson 1982; Alston and 
Ferrie 1985, 1993; Libecap and Wiggins 1985) research on interest groups has 
shown, the relative strength of  the competing groups has an important effect 
on the types of  regulations enacted and on the specific forms that they take. 
We focus on the adoption of  workers’ compensation  in Missouri to explore 
the reasons Missouri’s law took the form it did and to identify which political 
conditions in the state facilitated or hindered the passage of the law. 
Missouri’s enactment of the legislation was by no means typical, but it is the 
state’s atypicality that makes it a rich testing ground for how interest groups 
aligned with respect to the various components of  the workers’ compensation 
proposals. Missouri was among the first ten states to express interest in work- 
ers’ compensation legislation but the sole one of the ten not to pass a workers’ 
compensation law by 1913 (Clark 1925,602).’ The Missouri legislature finally 
passed a compensation law in  1919, but the law was struck down in a voter 
referendum in 1920. The Missouri General Assembly adopted a different ver- 
sion of workers’ compensation in  1921, but that too was struck down by the 
voters in a 1922 referendum. Organized labor put an initiative referendum on 
the ballot in 1924 that offered a completely different set of parameters, but the 
voters rejected this plan as well. Finally, in a 1926 referendum voters accepted 
the workers’ compensation law enacted in the 1925 session of the legislature. 
The drawn-out legislative  and  electoral  processes  in  Missouri  provide  a 
unique opportunity to investigate how competing interest groups helped shape 
the different features of the proposed workers’ compensation legislation in the 
state. Our focus on  Missouri’s workers’  compensation  experience  confirms 
Stigler’s (197 1) conclusion that small, homogeneous interest groups use their 
political influence  to shape the  regulatory  environment. Whereas organized 
labor, employers, or damage-suit  attorneys  made up a small fraction  of the 
electorate, they wielded considerable strength in proposing legislation, fram- 
ing the public debate, and exploiting the political process for their own ad- 
vantage. 
2. For state-level case studies see Asher 1969, 1973, 1983; Castrovinci 1976; Tripp 1976. For 
empirical studies on the determinants of the passage of  the law, see Pavalko  1989; Fishback and 
Kantor 1991; Buffum 1992. For general nonempincal studies see Lubove 1967; Weinstein  1967. 
3. When Governor Herbert S. Hadley appointed a volunteer compensation commission in 1910, 
only  Connecticut (1907). Illinois (1909, Massachusetts (1903, Minnesota (1909), New  York 
(1909), and Wisconsin (1909) already had commissions in place. Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Washington joined Missouri in establishing commissions in  1910. 265  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
A further advantage of concentrating on Missouri is that, unlike most states, 
the electorate voted directly on the workers’ compensation issue. Since Mis- 
souri voters cast ballots on four different laws in the 1920s, we can examine 
how voting behavior changed in response to the different features of the pro- 
posals. Further, we have been able to identify situations when the legislature 
voted  on key  aspects of  workers’ compensation, such as state insurance or 
raising maximum allowable death benefits, that voters also considered. These 
data allow us to examine differences  in the effectiveness  of  interest groups 
inside the legislature and in the referenda process. The election returns allow 
us to examine more effectively how well the statements and actions of union 
leaders and legislators represented the interests of  their constituents. 
8.2  Coalition Support for Workers’ Compensation 
The battle over workers’ compensation in the early twentieth  century was 
more than a question of whether to adopt the law or not. Instead, the debate in 
most states centered on the specific form the law would take. Workers’ com- 
pensation received wide-ranging support from a variety of disparate interests 
that expected to benefit from the law. What industries would be included, how 
many employees a firm needed before it was required to insure, the level of 
benefits, the waiting period, the means of insuring, and the provisions for con- 
flict resolution, however, generated bitter dispute because they determined the 
extent to which  income would be redistributed-from  employer to worker, 
from employer  to employer, from worker to worker,  or from employer  and 
worker to insurance companies or lawyers. 
Although composing a relatively small segment of the population and voting 
electorate, unions, employers, insurance companies, attorneys, and state offi- 
cials critically influenced the adoption of workers’ compensation and the par- 
ticular form the laws took. At the legislative level these groups wielded  far 
more power than their numbers would suggest, and they generated concerted 
opposition when their interests were directly threatened. Labor and employer 
representatives and state labor officials, for example, were appointed to com- 
missions designated to investigate workers’ compensation and to draft bills for 
the legislature’s consideration.  In essence, legislators entrusted those parties 
with a direct stake in the law to control the flow of information. Control over 
the agenda, in turn, provided particular interest groups the opportunity to steer 
the public and legislative debates in their favor. Damage-suit lawyers and some 
union groups in the Missouri case were able to slow the law’s passage by  ex- 
ploiting their state constitutional rights to the initiative and referendum mecha- 
nism, which provided for voter ratification of legislative acts. 
One of  the main shortcomings of previous historical research on workers’ 
compensation  is that the statements of labor or employer representatives, like 
the American Federation of  Labor or the National Association of Manufactur- 
ers, have been taken to reflect the beliefs of all members. Yet the intensity of 266  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
interest in workers’ compensation laws and specific aspects of the laws proba- 
bly  varied  greatly. Injured workers’  postaccident  compensation rose sharply 
with the adoption of the legislation, but offsetting effects in the labor market, 
which have been previously ignored, might have led to differences in the inten- 
sity of workers’ attitudes. Fishback and Kantor (1993a) found that semiskilled 
and  unskilled  workers  experienced  a  wage  reduction  after  the adoption  of 
workers’ compensation, potentially large enough to cancel the expected gains 
from higher postaccident benefits under workers’ compensation. Wage offsets 
for more highly  skilled and unionized workers, however, were much smaller. 
Therefore, skilled workers could anticipate higher monetary benefits from the 
shift to workers’ compensation and thus had a greater stake in the legi~lation.~ 
Similarly, skilled workers had an interest in designing the law with high benefit 
ceilings in order to maximize  their returns from the law. Lower-skilled  and 
thus lower-paid workers had little direct interest in high maximum death bene- 
fits because their wages would not have been subject to the ceilings and would 
have adjusted downward in response to the generous benefits. 
Workers’ attitudes might have differed in intensity along other lines as well. 
Large numbers of workers had little interest in workers’ compensation because 
it had little bearing on their employment. Agricultural workers, domestic work- 
ers, and those  in  small  firms were generally  excluded from coverage under 
workers’ compensation.s Further, many workers were in firms and industries 
where accident risk was very low. 
Even among organized labor, which historians claim had the greatest inter- 
est in adopting workers’  compensation, there were conflicts over the appro- 
priate strategy to provide injured workers with more generous accident bene- 
fits.  In  Illinois  the  unions  fought  over  whether  workers’  compensation or 
stripping employers of their three common law defenses was the best way  to 
proceed (Castrovinci 1976). In Missouri unions split over the optimal political 
strategy for obtaining their most desired law: either get workers’ compensation 
passed immediately and fine-tune it with amendments later or get all the de- 
sired features up front to avoid a prolonged struggle. 
The conclusion that employers categorically accepted the idea of workers’ 
compensation, which is also a central theme in the historical literature, fails to 
consider the different interests of various types of employers. Weinstein (1  967) 
4. If unskilled workers were risk averse, they still might have anticipated gains from the workers’ 
compensation law, despite the reduction  in their wages. In essence the wage reduction was akin to 
paying a premium for accident insurance. It seems reasonable to presume that skilled and unskilled 
workers had similar levels of risk aversion, such that skilled workers would have gained more from 
the passage of  the law than unskilled workers because the skilled workers did not experience the 
same reduction  in wages. 
5. Of the employed in Missouri  in  1920, 30 percent were in agriculture. Agricultural workers 
represented a large fraction of the percentage employed in many counties because the mean across 
counties was greater than 53 percent. Domestic workers were 8.7 percent of  the employed. Less 
dangerous occupations in the professions, clerical  occupations, and trade accounted for another 
25 percent (Bureau of  the Census 1923b. 50). 267  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
and Bale (1987) argue that businesses used workers’ compensation to preempt 
political organization by labor. Employers, it is also claimed, supported work- 
ers’ compensation to render accident payments more stable in the face of ran- 
domly fluctuating negligence awards. As state legislatures began stripping em- 
ployers  of  their  common  law  defenses,  the  National  Association  of 
Manufacturers and many state business organizations saw workers’ compensa- 
tion as a way to stem the tide of more frequent and larger  jury awards to injured 
workers  (Lubove  1967; Castrovinci  1976; Kent  1983; Tripp  1976). Further, 
employers criticized insurance companies for paying out only 25 to 40 percent 
of their liability premiums to injured employees, while the remainder went to 
litigation costs, administrative costs, and insurance profits (see Buffum 1992). 
Overall, workers’ compensation was expected to reduce the animosity between 
workers and employers as the adversarial relationship generated in negligence 
suits was replaced with the guarantee of relatively generous accident compen- 
sation. 
The type of workers a firm hired, however, was likely to temper its general 
support  for workers’  compensation. Although  employers  of  unskilled  and 
semiskilled labor may have been able to pass the cost of the new law onto their 
workers, employers of skilled and unionized workers could not (Fishback and 
Kantor 1993a). All else constant, we might expect that employers of the latter 
class of workers had mixed views on the compensation issue, and if they did 
support the legislation, they would have pushed for smaller benefit percentages 
and/or benefit ceilings. Even if some employers could anticipate a wage offset, 
the lowering of wages in response to an increase in benefits raised the likeli- 
hood of  worker protests, giving all firms an incentive to lobby for the lowest 
level of benefits possible. 
Employers may also have fought over experience rating, as firms with better 
safety records would have subsidized more hazardous firms if the rating system 
were incomplete. On the other hand, safer firms may have pushed for workers’ 
compensation as a means of  imposing  added insurance  costs on their more 
hazardous (in terms of accidents) competitors (see, e.g., Bartel and Thomas 
1985). 
The specifics of  workers’ compensation bills immediately caught the atten- 
tion of a variety of  numerically small, yet politically powerful, interest groups. 
Insurance companies actively supported the introduction of workers’ compen- 
sation, possibly because they anticipated  an increase in their accident insur- 
ance business (Fishback and Kantor 1993b). They strongly opposed the intro- 
duction of state insurance funds, however, particularly monopoly state funds 
that would have completely eliminated their ability to write workers’ compen- 
sation policies in a state. Damage-suit attorneys actively opposed systems that 
reduced the role of the courts in adjudicating compensation disputes. In fact, 
twenty years  after workers’  compensation had been  enacted in most states, 
attorneys continued to deride the administrative systems and called for admin- 
istration by the courts (Dodd 1936, 62). 268  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
Bureaucratic agents,  such as state labor department  officials,  had  an  im- 
portant role and a vested  interest in the passage of  workers’  compensation. 
These officials often participated in the writing of the bills, which gave them 
the ability to focus the debate on particular issues. This agenda-setting power 
could  have been  particularly  critical  as  the  attitudes  of  labor  departments 
tended to vary  across states from prounion to probusiness. No matter what 
their ideological bent, however, bureaucrats may have sought to expand their 
political  influence, which gave them an interest in supporting administrative 
hearings and state insurance funds (Borcherding 1977). 
Agricultural interests also played a role in shaping workers’ compensation. 
Interstate empirical studies show that  the law’s adoption rate  was slower in 
more agricultural states (Pavalko  1989; Fishback  and Kantor  199  1). Alston 
and Ferrie (1985, 1993) claim that large-scale southern farmers opposed many 
social welfare reforms because the legislation would have weakened their pa- 
ternal relationships over their workers. Nearly all workers’ compensation bills 
tried to appease agricultural interests by excluding agricultural workers from 
coverage. Farmers’ views on workers’ compensation, however, may have been 
largely shaped by their role as taxpayers. Purely on taxation grounds, agricul- 
turalists, along with other taxpayers, were likely to oppose compensation bills 
that might have led to increased taxation.  In particular, issues that generated 
heated debates were proposals to establish state insurance funds and provisions 
for creating a relatively large bureaucratic agency to administer the program. 
The state fund raised taxpayers’ concerns that the fund would become insol- 
vent, leading to a taxpayer bailout.h 
8.3  The Path to Workers’ Compensation in Missouri 
The central role that influence groups play in shaping the adoption of  any 
type of regulation is aptly characterized, if not caricatured, by the adoption of 
workers’ compensation in Missouri. Employers,  labor union  representatives, 
and damage-suit attorneys exercised substantial influence over the entire adop- 
tion process. Each group offered its own bills to the Missouri General Assem- 
bly,  lobbied  legislators, fed them  information for the debates, and  once the 
legislation was passed, used the referenda and initiative process to subvert any 
legislative actions that were contrary to their interests. How these highly orga- 
nized and influential groups, with their considerable economic and political 
resources, influenced the legislative process and popular support for workers’ 
6. While no losses had been incurred by state funds by 1934, Dodd’s (1936,551-52)  descriptions 
of state funds suggest that voters had reason to worry that tax revenues would be tapped to support 
bankrupt state insurance funds. Washington and West Virginia, for example, sometimes found it 
necessary to make loss payments in warrants rather than in cash. Many funds were not on a safe 
actuarial basis, and deficits developed in funds for a number of industries. Dodd (552) claimed 
that no injured employee would he denied benefits from a state fund because, “if a state fund . , . 
were unable to meet its obligations, the interested groups in the community would almost certainly 
have sufficient political strength to obtain payment from the public treasury.” 269  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
compensation  in  Missouri  demonstrates  that  a better  understanding  of  the 
political-economic origins of workers’ compensation can be found in the de- 
tails. 
The impetus for workers’ compensation in Missouri came in 1910 when the 
governor appointed a commission to investigate the workings of the employers’ 
liability  system and the feasibility of a workers’ compensation law. The com- 
mission prepared an employers’ liability measure for the 191  1 session, which 
was subsequently killed in the house judiciary committee, and requested that 
the legislature create its own investigative commission. The general assembly’s 
191  1 commission included legislators from both chambers and citizens repre- 
senting  organized  labor,  manufacturing,  insurance,  and  financial  interests. 
Since employer and labor representatives could not strike a compromise-la- 
bor asking for unlimited benefits and state insurance and employers asking for 
the exact opposite-no  serious legislation was introduced in 1913. The senate 
therefore appointed another commission that was to report to the 1915 legisla- 
ture. The commission held months of  hearings and travelled to several states 
and, in the end, proposed that Missouri enact an elective workers’ compensa- 
tion act, establish an industrial commission, provide for private mutual insur- 
ance, and impose a 5 percent tax on insurance premiums to support the indus- 
trial commission (MBLS 1921, 206). Although the senate proposal received a 
favorable recommendation from the insurance committee, the whole chamber 
never acted upon the bill. The Missouri State Federation of Labor (MSFL) and 
manufacturing interests could agree that workers’ compensation  in principle 
was worth pursuing, but the groups could not agree on the particulars of a law. 
The 19 I5 session ended with no legislation because the parties disagreed on 
the levels of accident payments, waiting periods, whether occupational disease 
should be covered, and organized labor’s central goal, state insurance (MBLS 
192  1, 206). 
After two legislative sessions without a compromise with employers, Mis- 
souri’s main unions began to split. In  1917 both the MSFL and the St. Louis 
Building Trades Council (SLBTC) presented separate bills before the legisla- 
ture, and a third measure presented by a group of employers was “refuted by 
organized labor” (MBLS 192  I, 187). With divisions deepening between labor 
and capital and within labor, the session ended with the legislature far from a 
compromise Compensation law. 
Realizing that their efforts to adopt a workers’ compensation law favorable 
to them were diminished if they did not present a united front, the two major 
organized labor groups tried to reach a consensus at the MSFL‘s  annual con- 
vention in 19  18. After three days of negotiations with no settlement, the MSFL, 
the SLBTC, and the Kansas City Building Trades Council (KCBTC) empow- 
ered a special compensation committee to draft a bill for the 1919 legislature 
(MBLS 1921, 188). The special committee not only included representatives 
from the SLBTC, the KCBTC, and the MSFL, but also the commissioner of 
the Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics William H. Lewis and his supervisor 270  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
of  statistics A. T.  Edmonston  (1 88). What became known  as the Labor Bill 
(summarized in table 8.2) contained organized labor’s main objectives: a mo- 
nopoly  state insurance fund and generous maximum benefits with no ceiling 
(204).’ 
In 1919 the house passed an amended version of the Labor Bill, imposing 
an $18 weekly maximum but keeping  the state insurance feature intact. The 
house  bill  was  subsequently  killed  in  the  senate  Workmen’s Compensation 
Committee, and two efforts by senators sympathetic to the MSFL to place the 
bill on the calendar failed. The senate then passed its own bill (actually a com- 
mittee substitute bill), which was later adopted by the house and signed by the 
governor. The senate bill  was much more amenable to employers’ interests, 
placing a maximum of $15 on weekly benefits and eliminating public insur- 
ance (compare columns I and 2 in table 8.2 for differences in what labor asked 
for and what was ultimately enacted). 
MSFL president Rube T. Wood claimed that when the senate bill arrived in 
the house “if the bill had been amended by the dotting of an ‘i’ or the crossing 
of a ‘t’ it would have been killed by  an adverse committee upon its return to 
the Senate. The only possible chance to pass a compensation law at this session 
was to pass the substitute through the House without amendment.” Wood rea- 
soned that if  state insurance  and high benefits were not politically  feasible, 
then the goal should be to get the best workers’ compensation bill possible and 
to seek prolabor amendments in subsequent legislation. He assured the SLBTC 
and the KCBTC that 
we [MSFL] stood by  the building trades people in a last-ditch fight which 
almost resulted in the defeat of all compensation measures by the Legisla- 
ture. We could at any time have obtained the passage of a bill acceptable to 
the other labor interests of the State, but we fought with the building trades 
to the last. After the fight had failed and we began a last desperate struggle 
to get compensation on the statutes, they deserted us instantly and made an 
open fight on the floor of the House against the passage of the Senate substi- 
tute.  They  were  defeated  and  the  bill  was  passed  almost unanimously. 
(“Compensation  Law  Pleases  Labor Chief,”  Sr.  Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 
April  1919). 
The building  trades adhered  to  an  all-or-nothing  strategy, either  workers’ 
compensation  with state insurance and high maximum benefits or no law at 
7. Rube T.  Wood of the MSFL claimed that the monopolistic insurance and no maximum pay- 
ment limit was insisted upon by the SLBTC (“Compensation Law Pleases Labor Chief,” Sr. Louis 
Post-Dispalch, 29 April  1919). The SLBTC’s opposition to private insurance is best summarized 
in statements made by Maurice Cassidy, the secretary of  the SLBTC: “Inexperienced persons who 
would be entitled to compensation will have to deal with trained insurance claim agents, whose 
reputations for dishonorable dealings are world-wide. After they  brow-beat the claimants into 
accepting what  they  have  to offer,  these  claim-adjusters, posing as the employers, will  get the 
claimant to  sign  the  settlement papers”  (“Defeat the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law,”  Trades 
Couricil  Union News,  29  October  1920, 6). For  the  MSFL‘s  views  of  how state insurance cut 
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wage 
(continued) 
1919 Act  1921 Act 
Labor Bill  Proposition 14  Proposition 11 
1918  1920  1922 
Employer  Employer  Employer 
with 5 or  with 5 or  with 5 or 
more  more  more 
Domestic and  Domestic and  Domestic and 
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2/3 of weekly 
wage 
All public  Uncertain"  Covered only 
employees  if adopted by 
except  law or 
officials and  ordinance 
employees 
who reject act 
On employer  On employer  On employer  On employer 
$15  $20  $30  $20 
$8  $6  $6  $10  $6 
66.67  66.67  66.67  66.61  66.67 Table 8.2  (continued) 
Feature 
1919 Act  1921 Act  1925 Act 
Labor Bill  Proposition 14  Proposition 11  Proposition 6  Proposition  I 


















0 days  7 days unless  7 days unless  2 days 
disability lasts  disability lasts 
6 weeks  4 weeks 




$200  $100  $150  $250 
300 weeks  300 weeks  300 weeks  3 12 weeks 
400 weeks  400 weeks  400 weeks  400 weeks 
$200  $200 
400 weeks 
Rest of life 




max $12 per 
week 
240 weeks at 
213; rest of 
life at 2/5 




max $20 per 
week 
240 weeks at 
213; rest of 
life at 112 




213  for life 
3% tax on 
insurance 
premiums 
3 days unless 
disability 








300 weeks at 
2/3;  rest of 
life at 114 
2% tax on 
insurance 
premiums Nature of  3  4  4  5  3 
commission  commissioners,  commissioners,  commissioners,  commissioners,  commissioners, 
$7000 each  $4000 each;  $3500 each;  $6,000 each,  $4500 each; 
secretary at  secretary at  secretary at  who can 
$3500;  $2500;  employ  $2600; 
medical  medical  assistants  medical 
advisor at  advisor at  examiner at 
$4000  $4000  $4000 
Insurance  Monopoly  Private or  Private or  Monopoly  Private or 
state fund  self-insure  competitive  state fund  self-insure 
state fund 
Sources; MSFL bill of  1918: (MBLS 1918-20,  188-204).  1919 law: Clark and Frincke, 1921, 42, 622-38.  1921 law: Missouri Secretary 
of State 1921a, 425-58.  1925 law: BLS 1926b. Sources for 1924 referendum: “The Amendments Made Plain,” St. Louis Post-Disparch, 
29 October  1924, 19; statements by  Alroy Phillips, labor lawyer, later on first Workmen’s Compensation Commission, in “In Missouri,” 
Kansas City  Stal; 2 November 1924; Irene Sylvester Chubb, American Association for Labor Legislation, letter to the editor, St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 2 November  1924; Associated Industries of Missouri, “Drastic Workmen’s Compensation  Bill Proposed by  Organized 
Labor of Missouri,” bulletin, n.d. 
“It is not clear how the 1921 act would have treated public employees. In the title of the 1921 act, the system is claimed to be compulsory 
for the state, its counties, municipal coroporations,  and other public employers unless their employees reject the act (425). But when 
defining employers in the act, the definition specifically excludes the state, county, municipal corporations, township, school, road, drdin- 
age, swamp and levy districts, school board, and so forth (428). 274  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
all. The building trades and some other union elements, in fact, joined damage- 
suit attorneys, who clearly had an interest in striking down workers’ compensa- 
tion, in circulating a petition to put the legislative  act before the voters in  a 
November 1920 referendum.8 The strategy was successful. Voters rejected the 
1919 workers’ compensation law by a close 52.2 to 47.8 percent.’ 
By 1921 the MSFL, the Associated Industries of Missouri (AIM), and other 
employer organizations were cooperating for the passage of another workers’ 
compensation  law  (Kansas City Star; 6 November  1922, 5; St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, 25 March  1921, 33). The act that was ultimately adopted had many 
similarities to the one enacted in 1919, but added a state fund that would com- 
pete with private insurance and raised the weekly maximum benefit from $15 
to $20 (see table 8.2). The inclusion  of  state insurance was actually a last- 
minute floor amendment that,  as we  show below, was widely  supported  by 
opponents of  workers’ compensation.  By  192  1 legislators could expect that 
any legislative  act would be challenged  in  a referendum. Thus, by  saddling 
workers’ compensation with state insurance, which voters opposed, the oppo- 
nents hoped to ensure the law’s defeat at the polls. 
The damage-suit lawyers in concert with the building trades councils again 
forced a referendum. Missouri voters once again struck down workers’ com- 
pensation by  a comfortable margin, 55.2 to 44.8 percent.  The lawyers also 
added an initiative to the ballot that would have abolished the fellow servant 
defense, substituted comparative negligence for contributory negligence, and 
left assumption  of risk up to the jury (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 6 November 
1922, 20; listing of “joker” proposition  18 in Trades Council Union News, 13 
October 1922). Moreover, if  accepted, the initiative would have repealed the 
1921 legislative act if both measures passed in the November 1922  referendum 
(MBLS 1923,936). Voters, however, soundly defeated the lawyers’ alternative 
(79.9 to 20.1 percent). 
By  1923 AIM was claiming that employers’ liability was reaching a crisis, 
with some insurance companies actually pulling out of Missouri. Despite the 
impetus for workers’ compensation, the general assembly failed to enact new 
workers’ compensation legislation in the  1923 session.1° Lindley Clark (1925, 
602) reported in the Monthly Labor Review that the chances of legislation were 
wrecked by organized labor’s demands for an exclusive state insurance system. 
Despite its losses in the legislature, the MSFL managed to put an initiative on 
8. After  the petition was filed, the Missouri  secretary of state, MSFL president Wood, other 
labor leaders, insurance men, and corporation lawyers who favored  the new law instituted court 
proceedings in the Jefferson City Circuit Court to have the referendum set aside. The lower court 
sustained their motion. The referendum supportcrs appealed to the state supreme court, however, 
which reversed the lower court and ordered the referendum to proceed (MBLS 1918-20,  892). 
9. The workers’  compensation was  supported by  the  Republican candidate Hyde, who won 
the election (St. Louis  Post-Disparch,  3  1 October  1930, 4). The Republicans also achieved the 
“impossible,” their first majority in the senate (Kansas City Srac 4 November 1920). 
10. Associated Industries of  Missouri, Bulletin nos. 150 (10 March  1923). 169 (12 September 
1923), 185 (1  I June 1924). 275  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
the November  1924 ballot  that included organized  labor’s demands without 
compromise: an exclusive state insurance fund and maximum weekly benefit 
levels  of  $30,  double  the  maximum  benefits  in  neighboring  Illinois  and 
Kansas.” 
AIM and other industry groups actively opposed labor’s proposal, sending 
out 2 million pieces of  literature and placing advertisements in five hundred 
newspapers and magazines.’* Opponents urged support from a wide range of 
interests. Since benefits were set so high, they argued that manufacturers would 
leave St. Louis and Kansas City for neighboring states.13  Since labor’s proposal 
would have required firms with as few as two employees to insure, AIM gained 
support from small business owners who otherwise might not have been di- 
rectly involved in workers’ compensation. Finally, and probably with most suc- 
cess, opponents appealed to the taxpayer, since organized labor proposed set- 
ting up an expensive commission of five members with salaries of $6,000 each, 
creating a monopoly state insurance fund, and appropriating more than $4 mil- 
lion to start it (BLS  1925a,  161; “The Amendments  Made Plain,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 29 October 1924, 19;  Kansas City Stal; 2 November 1924,3A). 
Not surprisingly, the initiative was strongly defeated, 72.6 to 27.4 percent. 
Organized labor’s sound defeat in 1924 and employers’ increasing urgency 
to adopt a workers’ compensation law led to a compromise in the 1925 legisla- 
tive session (Clark 1925, 602).14  The 1925 act (summarized in table 8.2) was 
among the  more liberal laws at the time. No other  state’s accident  benefits 
exceeded the 1925 act’s two-thirds of the wage, and its $20 per week payment 
ceiling  was  higher  than  ceilings  in  neighboring  Kansas  and  Illinois  (BLS 
1926b, 23, 26). The generous benefit ceiling put Missouri fifth (tied with six 
others) among all workers’  compensation  states, while  its three-day  waiting 
period tied Missouri for third among the states (BLS 1926a, 1224; 1926b, 64, 
66). Without  state insurance, the bill also gained support from the insurance 
industry. Other aspects of the bill were also designed to build a winning coali- 
tion. The number of commissioners was cut, as were their salaries, and public 
employees were covered under the law only if  individual municipalities  de- 
cided so (BLS 1925b, 1329-30). Thus, the general public’s worries about pay- 
ing more taxes for a larger bureaucracy  or an insolvent state insurance fund 
were assuaged. 
Again, the damage-suit lawyers financed  a petition for a referendum. The 
11. Kansas had  a weekly maximum of  $15, while Illinois’ weekly maximum was $14 (BLS 
12. Associated Industries of  Missouri. Bulletin nos. 191 (1 October 1924), 197 (12 November 
13. Associated Industries of Missouri, Bulletin no. 177 (13 December 1923). 
14. Views on the probability of ever passing a workers’ compensation law varied widely at the 
beginning of  1925. A state labor official saw no reason why a workable workers’ compensation 
law could not be enacted. On the other hand, the Monthly Labor Review received reports that the 
difference of opinion over the nature of  the hill  was so great that it would he difficult to agree 
upon a measure to get sufficient support for passage (Clark 1925, 602). 
1926, 23, 26). 
1924). 276  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
petition drive was also publicly announced under the name of the SLBTC, but 
there are conflicting accounts of how big a role the SLBTC played.” Recogniz- 
ing labor sentiment for an exclusive state insurance fund and hoping to divide 
the supporters of  the  1925 act, the trial lawyers drew up their own workers’ 
compensation initiative that included an exclusive state fund (Andrews  1926, 
266). The lawyers’ counterinitiative also contained  a clause that would  have 
repealed the legislative act if both propositions passed. 
The attempt at subversion was not successful. Organized labor, employers, 
the major newspapers, press groups, farm groups, the Democratic  Party, the 
Republican Party, and a wide range of other supporters focused efforts on pass- 
ing the legislative bill.lh Although the SLBTC still sought exclusive state insur- 
ance, it finally relented.  Just prior to the referendum, John  Barry, president 
of  the SLBTC, urged  workers to vote for the  1925 legislative act, arguing, 
“[Elstablish workers’ compensation now, and we can take care of improvement 
in law as experience  justifies demand’ (Trades Council Union News, 22 Octo- 
ber 1926, I).” 
Voters finally accepted workers’ compensation as enacted by the legislature, 
voting in favor of the legislation 69.0 to 31.0 percent. The trial lawyers were 
overwhelmingly embarrassed as their counterinitiative lost 20.8 to 79.2 percent 
(BLS 1926a, 1224). The law went into effect in 1927, administered by a three- 
man commission composed of  Ahoy s. Phillips (chairman), Orrin Shaw, and 
Everett Richardson. The MSFL strongly influenced this first commission. Phil- 
lips was a prominent lawyer for the labor movement, and Shaw was the fifth 
vice president of the MSFL. 
8.4  An Empirical Analysis of the Coalition Alignment in Missouri 
The use and the threat of veto characterized the adoption of workers’ com- 
pensation in Missouri. In the legislature and in the referenda, when labor and 
capital could not agree, the legislation was stalled. After three attempts at com- 
promise, organized labor relented in its demand for state insurance, and em- 
ployers eased their demand for low benefits. The coalition was solidified, and 
the lawyers’ attempts to subvert the agreement in 1926 was fruitless. The short- 
coming of the descriptive analysis of the coalition-building process in Missouri 
15. The American  Labor Legislation Review reported that the referendum was invoked by the 
building trades labor group, stimulated and aided by damage-suit lawyers (Andrews 1926, 266). 
16. Supporters of the bill listed in an advertisement in the Kansas City  Srar (I November 1926) 
included the Democratic and Republican parties, the American Federal of Labor, the Associated 
Industries of  Missouri, Industrial  Employers of Missouri, the Missouri Bankers Association, the 
Missouri Farmers’ Association, the League of  Women Voters, the Missouri Press Association, the 
Missouri Retail Merchants’ Associalion, the MSFL, numerous Kansas City union locals, the Kan- 
sas City Chamber of Commerce. and numerous groups representing employers, merchants, and 
professionals. The Kansas City Star (31 October 1926, 6A) also editorialized in favor of the legis- 
lative version and against the alternative. 
17. Another labor slogan  was “Sustain  the act and then at the first opportunity bring it up to 
desirable standards” (Andrews 1926, 266). 277  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
is that we must infer the interests of  large segments of the electorate only as 
they were filtered through the speeches of business and union leaders. Empiri- 
cal analysis of the referenda in Missouri offers an unusual opportunity to ex- 
amine directly how rank-and-file union members, different classes of workers, 
agricultural interests, and other less vocal parts of the electorate responded to 
different forms of workers’ compensation. 
For each of the workers’ compensation referenda from 1920 through  1926, 
we have collected the number of yes votes, no votes, and eligible voters who 
abstained in the workers’ compensation referenda for each of the 1 15 counties 
in Missouri. We use a minimum logit chi-square estimation to predict the prob- 
abilities that Missourians voted yes or no, or abstained.Ix The estimation proce- 
dure regresses the natural log of the ratio of yes to no votes (and the natural 
log of  the ratio of abstentions to no votes) on a series of independent variables 
(listed in table 8.3) that attempt to explain how voters responded to the major 
components of  the proposed legislation, how various interest groups voted on 
the propositions, and how the political climate in Missouri affected the voting. 
8.4.1  The Influence of Specific Features of the Workers’ Compensation 
Proposals 
To  determine how voters responded to the different forms of the workers’ 
compensation acts, we pool the referenda on the legislative acts in 1920, 1922, 
and 1926 and the initiative referendum on the union proposal in 1924 and then 
include variables that measure the two most widely  debated  features of  the 
workers’ compensation measures: a dummy variable with value one for state 
insurance and the maximum allowable death benefit (in 1890-99  dollars).19  By 
pooling the votes on the four referenda, we can directly test hypotheses about 
voters’ attitudes toward the two main features of the workers’ compensation 
18. See Maddala 1983, 29-30,  for a derivation of the econometric model. 
19. We  have also estimated separate regressions for each referendum and tested whether there 
are differences in the responses to the different referenda. Chow tests show that voter responses 
to each referendum are statistically different from each other. We believe the differences are de- 
rived largely from the differences in  the features of  the initiatives considered.  There are other 
possible interpretations of the differences, however. There may have been path-dependent changes 
in voting caused by the electorate’s experience in previous votes on workers’ compensation, Some 
have suggested that the 1924 referendum was not taken seriously because it was a vote on a labor- 
sponsored initiative, while the 1920, 1922, and 1926 referenda were on legislative acts. Given the 
large amount of advertising and public debate against the 1924 initiative, it seems that opponents 
of  the initiative considered it a serious threat. In fact, a higher percentage of the electorate casted 
ballots on  the initiative in  1924 than  on  the proposition in  1920. The reason  why  it had  little 
chance in  1924 was not because labor proposed it, per se, but because the initiative had features- 
monopoly state insurance and very high benefit ceilings-that  neither the public nor the legislature 
would accept. 
We  did not include the damage-suit attorney propositions (eighteen in  1922 and three in  1926) 
in the pooled samples for two reasons. First, the propositions were not easily categorized. Proposi- 
tion  18 in  1922 was an employers’ liability proposition and cannot be considered as a standard 
workers’ compensation bill. Proposition 3 in  1926 called for a state fund but was hazily written. 
Second, the propositions were widely publicized as attempts to cloud the issues with little chance 
of winning. In fact, neither proposition garnered more than 30 percent of the vote. 278  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
Table 8.3  Changes in the Probability of Voting Yes, No, and Abstaining on Workers’ 
Compensation Referenda, 1921-1926 
Mean 
Variables  (s.d.)  Yes  No  Abstain  Yes-No 
Probability  at sample means 
Characteristics of the workers’ 
compensation law under 
consideration 
State insurance (0,l)” 
Maximum value of death 
benefit ( 1890-99  $)” 
Description of  economic 
coalitions 
% gainfully employed 
In agriculturea 
In railroad work* 




Characteristics of  Missouri 
political climate 
% population black 
% electorate illiterate* 
% electorate voting for 
major Republican 
candidate* 
% electorate voting in 
presidential/senatorial 
election* 































-  1.538 
1.344 





-  1.970 
-0.770 











































Sources; Election data were obtained from Missouri Secretary of State 1921-22,  270-71.476-77;  1923- 
24,264-65,28 1-82.286-87;  1925-26,  193-94, 421-22;  1927-28,  192-93,292-95.  The eligible elector- 
ate is assumed to be males and females twenty-one years and older. Population data were obtained from 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1922,551-70; 1932, 1339-46.Off-year variables were derivedusing a straight- 
line interpolation. The gainfully employed variables, except the union one, are from U.S. Bureau of  the 
Census 1932, 1362-70. Because of data constraints, 1930 values were used for all years. The unionization 
variable  was estimated based on 1919 membership data reported in  MBLS  1921, 905. The MBLS re- 279  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
corded the total  number of  organized laborers in  the state’s major cities but gave an  aggregate for the 
remaining towns and cities. We  estimated the union  membership of  these remaining counties based on 
their  share of the total  town/city population of  all of  the remaining counties. We searched the MBLS 
reports  from the  1920s and could find only organized labor membership data for 1919; thus, we were 
forced to use the same set of data for each year. If the percentages did not change across the state over 
time, then this adds no bias to our overall estimates. Average annual wages are from the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1923b, 777-78.  The risk measure is from workers’ compensation payouts reported in Missouri 
Workmen’s Compensation Commission 1930, I1  9-2  1 ; 193  1,  198-20 1. 
Notes: Voting estimates are derived from a minimum logit chi-squared estimation of  the pooled set of 
election returns. The estimated probabilities are computed by setting each variable at its sample mean and 
the state insurance dummy variable to zero. The marginal effects reported here reflect the change in the 
baseline probability resulting from a one-standard-deviation change in the variable under consideration 
(holding all others constant at their means). The state insurance marginal reflects the change in the proba- 
bilities when the dummy variable changes from zero to one. 
“See table 8.5 for the significance of the individual variables and their related interaction terms. 
*Jointly statistically significant at the  I  percent level 
acts. In addition our analysis includes interaction terms between the state insur- 
ance variable and variables representing  three of the major economic groups 
interested in the legislation-agriculture,  organized labor, and members of the 
building  trades.  Interaction  terms were  also created between  the maximum 
benefits variable and the same three variables. The interaction effects enable us 
to identify specifically how each of these interest groups responded to different 
components of the proposed legislation. 
Table 8.3 shows the change in the probabilities of voting yes or no or abstain- 
ing associated with an one-standard-deviation increase in the value of the inde- 
pendent variables, with all other variables evaluated at their means. The change 
in the yes-no spread is the change in the probability of  voting yes minus the 
change in the probability of voting no. The changes in the voting probabilities 
are computed from the coefficients of  the minimum logit chi-squared estima- 
tion of the pooled election returns.2n  The probability  changes listed for state 
insurance show the impact of  moving from no state insurance to state insur- 
ance. Table 8.4 shows the breakdown of the marginal probabilities for the inter- 
action terms described above. 
It is clear that the key parameters of the law led to strong responses from 
the electorate. Missouri voters clearly rejected state insurance as a feature of 
workers’ compensation. The probability  changes in tables 8.3 and 8.4 show 
that the presence of state insurance in the bill led to strong opposition, shifting 
the yes-no spread by 23.7 percentage  points  against the yeses (the no votes 
were raised by  11  .O percentage points, while the yes votes fell by 12.7). Given 
that many workers were largely indifferent to workers’ compensation, the elec- 
torate’s opposition to a state fund was probably led by taxpayers, who feared an 
20. Results are available from the authors Table 8.4  Interaction Effects between Features of Workers’ Compensation and 
Key Interest-Group Variables 
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Union interaction 
Sum of effects 
Agriculture 
Direct effect* 
State insurance interactionb 
Benefits interaction* 
Sum of effects 
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Direct effect 
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Sum of effects 
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-  1.538 
0.178 
0.000 
-  1.825 
-  1.647 





































































-  2.92 1 
Sources: See table 8.3. 
Notes: The interaction effects listed in this table are from the logit regressions underlying the 
results reported in table 8.3. The sum of effects of the variables reported here is calculated as the 
sum of an individual variable’s direct effect and the effects generated from the interaction terms. 
For example, consider the equation Y = a + b,X + b,Z  + b,X*Z.  The marginal effect of variable 
X  on Y is aY = b,aX + b,axZ. In our estimate of the marginal effects, we have set dX to be Xs 
standard deviation and Z as its sample mean. Consider the construction of the effects of changing 
the maximum death benefits by one standard deviation (rows 6-10).  The “direct effect” represents 
the marginal effects on the voting from changing the benefits by one standard deviation, ignoring 
any interaction effects (it.,  assuming Z is zero). The agriculture interaction is the interaction effect 
of agriculture on the benefits variable (the b$XZ  term above). Holding the percentage gainfully 
employed in agriculture at  its sample mean, this effect  shows the extent to which agricultural 
interests affected the probability of voting yes or no or abstaining when the death benefits were 
changed. The same process is used for the interactions between maximum benefits and the build- 
ing trades and union variables. 
“The yes-no column is the change in the probability of voting yes minus the change in the probabil- 
ity of voting no. 
estimate of the interaction effect of state insurance on agriculture, the building trades, and 
unions is assumed to be zero. Since our baseline probability assumes no state insurance (i.e., the 
dummy variable is set at zero), the b,dXZ term becomes zero, because in this case Z is zero. 
*Jointly statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Jointly statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Jointly statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 281  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of  Workers’ Compensation 
expansion in expensive state bureaucracy  and feared that the state fund might 
become insolvent and lead to a taxpayer bailout. 
Not all voters opposed state insurance, however. Union men  and building 
tradesmen actively supported state insurance features in workers’ compensa- 
tion bills. Table 8.4 shows how specific interest groups altered the impact of 
state insurance on the voting. The calculations are derived from the interaction 
terms between state insurance and percentage  union, percentage in building 
trades, and percentage in agriculture described above (see the notes to table 
8.4 also). The individual partial effect in row  1 of  table 8.4 shows that,  in 
counties with no agriculture workers, building tradesmen, or union members, 
the presence of state insurance in the bill would have led to an 11.8 percentage 
point reduction in yes votes and a 13.2 point increase in no votes, shifting the 
yes-no spread against workers’ compensation by  25.0 percentage points. The 
presence of the mean number of agriculture workers (53.5 percent) increased 
the opposition engendered by  including state insurance in the proposition by 
pushing the yes-no spread another 6.1 percentage points (row 2 of table 8.4) 
against workers’ compensation. On the other hand, the presence of the mean 
percentage  of  union  members (4.1 percent) in the electorate  diminished the 
negative  impact  of  state insurance on the  yes-no  spread by  2.1 percentage 
points (row 4 of table 8.4), and the presence of the mean building tradesmen 
(3.0 percent) diminished the negative impact of  state insurance on the yes-no 
spread by  5.3 percentage points (row 3 of  table 8.4). The overall impact on 
the yes-no spread of  including state insurance in the workers’ compensation 
proposal is the sum of the components-  -23.7  percentage points, as reported 
in row 5 of table 8.4 and in table 8.3. 
The other workers’ compensation feature that sparked heated debate in Mis- 
souri was the maximum level of death benefits. As shown in tables 8.3 and 8.4 
(row lo), higher death benefits sparked a strong interest among voters. A one- 
standard-deviation increase in the maximum benefits caused a 6.2 percentage 
point drop in abstentions. The intensified  interest that the increased benefits 
produced, however, was equally split between yeses and nos. The same one- 
standard-deviation change in death benefits caused the yes-no spread to fall by 
only 0.4 point. Voters may have believed employers’ claims that high benefit 
levels would cause them to leave Missouri for low-benefit states, such as Kan- 
sas or Illinois. Working voters may have thought this factor outweighed the 
benefits because their wages were too low to hit the compensation  ceilings. 
The agriculture partial effect on the impact of maximum benefits (rows 7 and 
13 in table 8.4) suggests that agricultural interests supported higher benefits in 
workers’ compensation. Why farmers supported more generous compensation 
is perplexing. Their support may be a throwback to the political connection 
between farmers and labor during the Populist Era. 282  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback 
8.4.2 
In addition to opposing state insurance, voters in agricultural counties also 
opposed the general idea of workers’ compensation, although the opposition 
was  not  overwhelming.  A  17.5 percentage  point  increase  in the percentage 
employed in agriculture would have led to only a 3.4 point drop in the yes-no 
spread. Farming interests were a strong force in Missouri politics throughout 
the 1920s, with most counties having more than half of their workers engaged 
in  agriculture.”  All  of  the  workers’  compensation proposals,  however,  ex- 
cluded agriculture from coverage, which might be why farmers and farmwork- 
ers were largely indifferent to the legislation. 
A key benefit of  the analysis is that we can show how rank-and-file union 
members stood on the debate between the MSFL and the SLBTC leaders over 
the proper way  of passing a workers’ compensation bill. As noted earlier, the 
MSFL sought to pass any workers’ compensation bill and to fine-tune the bill 
later. The SLBTC wanted  a workers’ compensation bill  only if  it contained 
state insurance and high benefits. The analysis of the percentage of workers in 
unions and the percentage in the building trades suggests that the rank-and-file 
sided more with the SLBTC than with the MSFL. When there was no state 
insurance in the proposition, a 4.5 percentage point increase in the percentage 
union (one standard deviation from the mean of 4.1 percent)  led to a shift in 
the yes-no spread against workers’ compensation of 2.9 percentage points (row 
22 of  table 8.4). Similarly, a one-standard-deviation  increase in the building 
trade percentage of  1.9 points was associated with a 2.9 point shift in the yes- 
no spread against workers’  compcnsation (row  18 of table 8.4). When state 
insurance was included in the proposition, building  tradesmen  shifted to fa- 
voring workers’ compensation, while the rank-and-file union men’s opposition 
to workers’ compensation diminished. With state insurance included, a one- 
standard-deviation  increase in percentage  building  trades pushed the yes-no 
spread in favor of the bill by 0.5 percentage point. The one-standard-deviation 
increase in percentage union pushed the yes-no spread against workers’ com- 
pensation by only 0.7 percentage point.*? 
Union members and building tradesmen were such a small percentage of 
the electorate  that  they were unable  to shift the popular  vote by  much.  But 
these results indicate that a significant percentage  of the union rank-and-file 
must have opposed workers’ compensation when state insurance was not in- 
cluded. When the percentage employed in unions rose by one standard devia- 
Voting of Economic Interest Groups 
21. The value of farm products represented about 104 percent of the value added generated in 
all manufacturing pursuits (Bureau of  the Census,  1923b, 50; 1923a, 777). Agriculturalists had 
an  influential  voice  in the state legislature as well. In  1925, for example, 67 of  Missouri’s  150 
representatives (or about 45  percent) reported  their  occupation as either farming or livestock 
raising (Missouri Secretary of State 1925, 110-12). 
22. These changes in yes-no  spreads with state insurance included  in  the proposition are  not 
listed in tables 8.3 and 8.4 because they start from a different baseline assumption. The baseline 
in  tables 8.3 and 8.4 is state insurance equal to zero, while the baseline for these marginals for 
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tion (or 4.5 percentage points), their percentage of the voting population would 
have risen by about 2.9 percentage points.23  That 2.9 percentage point increase 
in the union share of the voting population was associated with a reduction in 
yes votes by 0.7 point and an increase in no votes of 2.2 points, or a shift in the 
yes-no spread against workers’ compensation  of  2.9 percentage points. That 
the change in the yes-no spread roughly matched the rise in the union’s share 
of the electorate suggests that the vast majority of union workers opposed the 
proposition without state insurance. Many of the rank-and-file might have con- 
sidered an employers’ liability bill with the elimination of the three defenses 
as a superior choice. Missouri voters actually considered such a proposition 
when they voted on the damage-suit attorneys’  alternative  proposition  18 in 
1922. The same 4.5 point increase in the union percentage  of the employed 
pushed the vote in  favor of  that proposition  by  a statistically significant  1.1 
percentage points.  24 
The percentage of  railroad  workers is included because the leaders of the 
railroad  unions were  said to be  active  supporters of the  MSFL position  on 
workers’  compensation.  Only  railroad  workers  involved  in  intrastate  com- 
merce had a direct interest in the Missouri legislation, however. Railroad work- 
ers involved in interstate commerce would have gained nothing from a state 
workers’  compensation  law  since they were covered  under the Federal Em- 
ployers’ Liability Act of  1908. Although railroad  workers had little stake in 
Missouri’s compensation law, the results indicate that they followed the MSFL 
in  supporting  workers’  compensation  insurance.  A  one-standard-deviation 
change in the percentage in the county working for the railroad caused a statis- 
tically significant 2.4 point increase in the yes-no 
Skilled, high-wage workers might have offered stronger support for work- 
ers’ compensation, because these groups did not experience wage offsets as a 
result of the law’s passage (Fishback and Kantor 1993a). In addition, workers 
in more dangerous jobs might have benefited  more from the legislation than 
those in relatively  safe jobszh  Variables that attempt to capture the effect of 
23. In both 1919 and 1929 the ratio of  the population employed to the population aged twenty- 
24. The 1922 proposition 18 regression results are available from the authors. 
25. There may be some overlap between railroad workers and union workers; the correlation of 
percentage union and percentage railroad in the sample is 0.675. Our conclusion that the railroad 
workers overwhelmingly supported workers’ compensation needs to be tempered because union 
members tended to oppose the legislation. 
26. The view that workers in more dangerous jobs would benefit more from workers’ compensa- 
tion than workers in safer jobs holds under the following conditions. If there were no wage offset 
caused by the rise in postaccident compensation, then workers in more dangerous jobs would gain 
more from the switch than workers in less dangerous jobs, as long as pd Ui >  p, U:, where p  is 
the probability of the accident and U’ is the marginal utility of the income level associated with 
the accident for workers in dangerous (d)  and safe (s)  jobs. In other words, the workers in more 
dangerous jobs gain more as long as the higher risk of their jobs is not more than offset by greater 
risk aversion on the part of  workers in safer jobs. To the extent that there is a wage offset from the 
rise in postaccident compensation, the comparison becomes more complicated. We can say that, 
if both sets of workers are risk neutral, the worker in the more dangerous job gains more than the 
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these two economic coalitions on the voting do not bear out our predictions. 
The average annual manufacturing earnings per employee in a county affected 
the voting in a small and statistically insignificant way. It may be that an alter- 
native measure, the percentage  of  workers above a certain wage, would be a 
better proxy, but data for such a variable are unavailable at the county level. 
Our measure of accident risk in each county is the average workers’ compensa- 
tion payout per eligible worker in 1929 and  1 930.’7 Counties that had relatively 
higher workers’  compensation  payments in 1929 and  1930, however, did not 
add any significant support for the law’s adoption. 
8.4.3  The Influence of the Political Climate on the Referenda 
Party politics played some role in the furor over workers’ compensation in 
Missouri. Although the Democrat and Republican parties actively  supported 
workers’ compensation  in national platforms and Missouri Republican gover- 
nor  Hyde consistently  supported the  legislative propositions  in  1920, 1922, 
and  1926, Republican voters tended to oppose the legislation. Increasing the 
percentage of the electorate voting for the major Republican candidate in each 
election by  9.9 percentage points (one standard deviation from the variable’s 
sample mean) caused a statistically significant decrease in the yes-no spread 
of  1.1 points. 
Voter turnout was one of the critical determinants of the passage of workers’ 
compensation  in Missouri. Because all of  the workers’ Compensation propos- 
als were lengthy and not easily summarized in a paragraph on the ballot, voters 
were no doubt confused. The choices in  1922 and  1926 were further compli- 
cated because there were two contradictory propositions dealing with workers’ 
compensation on the ballot. Table 8.5 presents summary statistics of the voting 
for the four separate workers’ compensation referenda. One striking feature of 
the turnout figures that indicates the confusion that voters faced is the differ- 
ence between overall turnout at the polls and the percentage voting in the work- 
ers’ compensation referenda. For example, of  those voters who were already 
at the polls  in  1920, 38.2 percent  failed to cast a vote on the compensation 
issue. Abstentions among those who came to the polls fell over time, however. 
worker in the safer job with no wage offset, but the advantage for the worker in the more dangerous 
job narrows to Lero when there is a  full wage offset. Employers  in more dangerous industries 
similarly would support some form of workers’ compensation  if  they could anticipate reduced 
labor strife and incomplete experience rating of compensation insurance, although they were likely 
to support lower benefit levels. We limit our discussion of employers in this context because [hey 
were such a small percentage of the electorate and we anticipate that their influence was greater 
in the legislative voting. 
27. The risk variable is imperfect because it comes from a time period after the voting process 
was completed,  and some counties may  have  had an unusual experience  in  1929 or 1930. The 
latter concern is lessened since we are using a two-year average. These workers’ compensation 
data probably represent the best proxy for accident risk across counties because the manufacturing 
census did not provide detailed information on occupational mix at the county level, as it did for 
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Table 8.5  Summary Statistics of Voting in Workers’ Compensation Referenda 
Variables  1920  1922  1924 
% electorate voting for presidentkenator  72.24  55.45  69.95 
o/c electorate voting yes on workers’ compensation  12.23  11.19  8.36 
o/c electorate voting no on workers’ compensation  21.79  23.91  38.33 
9%  electorate abstaining in workers’ compensation 
referenda  65.98  64.89  53.31 
% voters casting ballot for prcsidentkenator, but abstaining 
in workers‘ compensation referenda  38.22  20.34  23.25 
Estimated probabilitier’ 
Voting yes  16.10  8.52  9.62 
Voting no  19.64  22.93  39.46 
Abstaining  64.26  68.55  50.92 





58.5  I 
12.11 




Sources: See table 8.3. 
,‘These  probability estimates are based on the regression coefficients underlying table 8.3. We have 
set all variable<.  except year-specitic ones, at their sample means. The characteristics of the work- 
ers‘ compensation  laws and voter turnout. however, were set at their actual values for each year. 
In the  1924 presidential election year, only 23.3 percent of the voters already 
at the polls failed to vote on workers’ compensation, and in 1926 the percent- 
age fell to 12.1 percent.’* 
The most  striking feature of  the turnout  data in table 8.5 is that  over 50 
percent of  the electorate did not  cast a vote on workers’ compensation in any 
of these elections. This finding is similar to many voting studies and suggests 
that large segments of the eligible electorate were either indifferent to the legis- 
lation  or found  the cost of  voting too high relative to  expected benefits.  It 
should not be surprising that a large segment of the electorate was indifferent 
to workers’ compensation. Agricultural workers and domestic service workers 
were excluded from coverage, many others worked in relatively  safe environ- 
ments, and many unskilled workers might have expected a wage offset when 
workers’  compensation benefits rose (see Fishback  and Kantor 1993a). The 
question remains whether this indifference benefited the opponents or support- 
ers of workers’ compensation. 
To answer the question, we include in the regression the percentage of the 
electorate that voted in the major election of the year (presidential elections in 
1920 and  1924 and senatorial elections in 1922 and  1926). The results show 
that one of the main reasons workers’ compensation finally passed in Missouri 
was that low voter turnout gave the advantage to the supporters of workers’ 
28. The turnout may have been  influenced in part by  thc number of  blacks and illiterates in 
Missouri counties, particularly if they were disfranchised. As found in  numerous voting studies, 
higher number5 of  black and illiterate voters were associated with more abstentions in this analy- 
sis. The abstentions appeared to be equally divided among yes or no voters, such that the yes-no 
spread was largely unchanged when the percentages black and illiterate rose. 286  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
compensation. There appears to have been a class of voters who were margin- 
ally opposed to workers’  compensation, perhaps because  of  the uncertainty 
associated with radically switching legal regimes. These voters may have been 
uncertain about the consequences of a complex bill and thus feared the poten- 
tial costs of changing the status quo. If these voters were already at the polls 
on election day, the marginal cost of casting a vote against workers’ compensa- 
tion was negligible. These voters were not willing, however, to expend the time 
to make a special trip to the polls just to vote in the workers’ compensation 
referendum. Thus during low turnout years, such as 1922 and 1926 (nonpresi- 
dential  election  years),  workers’  compensation benefited  because  many  of 
these voters who were marginally opposed to the legislation stayed at home. 
The regression analysis suggests that, if the percentage of the electorate voting 
in the major election (presidential or senatorial) increased by  12.2 percentage 
points (one standard deviation), then support for workers’ compensation would 
have dropped by 7.9 points. Such a shift was large enough to swing the election 
against workers’ compensation. If  we set the variables in the analysis at their 
sample means and assume no state insurance, the model predicts that workers’ 
compensation would win, with yes votes exceeding no  votes by 2.5 percentage 
points. A one-standard-deviation change in the percentage of the electorate at 
the polls (12.2 percentage points) would have translated into a defeat for work- 
ers’ compensation, with no votes exceeding yes votes by 5.4 percentage points. 
A summary of the analysis suggests workers’ compensation finally passed 
in the voter referenda because of two key reasons: the elimination of the state 
fund from the proposition and low voter turnout.2y  Most of  the other factors in 
the analysis  remained  largely  unchanged  throughout  the  period.  Table  8.5 
shows the predicted probabilities of yeses and nos for each referendum, based 
on the features of the proposition and the mean percentage voting in the major 
election in that year; the remaining variables are set at their means. Clearly, the 
presence of a state fund in the propositions contributed greatly to the losses in 
the 1922 and 1924 referenda. The simplest way to show this is to compare the 
results in 1920 and 1924,  both presidential election years with similar turnouts. 
The predicted probability of no votes exceeded the predicted yeses by only 3.5 
percentage points on the 1920 proposition with no state fund. The presence of 
the state fund contributed  to the predicted  nos exceeding  the yeses by  29.8 
percentage points in  1924, a shift of 26.3 points against workers’ compensa- 
29. One tnight argue that, since the legislation passed because a relatively large group of voters 
who were marginally opposed to the law refused to vote, there may have been future movements 
for repeal. Once workers’ compensation was enacted into law, however, it is highly unlikely that 
the state legislature  would have sought to repeal the law. After all, the legislators were in favor of 
the legislation; it was the voters who had killed it in  the previous years. Moreover, those voters 
who were marginally opposed to workers’ compensation certainly would not have been willing to 
expend the resources to get it repealed. The costs associated with organizing an initiative-based 
repeal movement probably  would have swamped any of the marginal benefits these voters would 
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tion. A decomposition  of  the difference in the yes-no spreads between  1920 
and  1924 shows that 72.2 percent of  the  26.3  percentage-point  shift toward 
voting no can be attributed to the switch to a state fund.’O 
The dramatic contribution of low voter turnout to the final passage of  work- 
ers’ compensation is shown by  comparing the results for 1920 and 1926. The 
1920 and  1926 bills both  had  no state insurance  and offered  similar benefit 
ceilings in real terms. Yet the predicted nos exceeded the yeses by 3.5 percent- 
age points in 1920, while the predicted yeses exceeded the nos by 7.0 points 
in  1926, a net shift of  10.5 percentage points in favor of workers’ compensa- 
tion. The key difference between the two years is the dramatic decline in turn- 
out from 72.2 percent of the electorate  in the presidential election of  1920 to 
53.6 percent in the senatorial election of  1926.” A decomposition of  the 10.5 
percentage point change in the yes-no shift suggests that 86.2 percent of  the 
change is attributable to the difference in voter turnout.’* 
8.5  Legislative Activity 
The analysis of  the referenda allows us to examine the voting on specific 
aspects of  workers’ compensation in the legislature from a different perspec- 
tive. Comparing the legislative votes with those from the referenda illuminates 
more directly  how  much  more  influence specific interest  groups  had  at the 
legislative level than at the grassroots level. Further, we can identify situations 
in which legislators voted strategically on certain features of the bill to enhance 
or harm its chances in the referenda. 
Although  a variety  of  workers’  compensation laws were proposed  in the 
Missouri legislature, very few ever came to a vote. The legislative votes on the 
final  versions  of  workers’  compensation bills  are  generally  uninformative 
about the specific support for various features of the legislation. Since the final 
bills represented a set of compromises and included several different compo- 
30. We  calculated the decomposition by reestimating the probabilities in  1920 assuming there 
was state insurance, leaving all other factors the same, leading to a yes-no spread of -22.6  percent- 
age points. We then subtracted the estimated yes-no spread for 1920 based on  no state insurance 
of  -3.5  (see table 8.5). The difference of  19.1 percentage points  was 72.2 percent of  the 26.3- 
percentage-point difference between the predicted yes-no spreads in 1920 and 1924. If we recalcu- 
late  the decompositions by  starting with the  1924 estimated probabilities and eliminating state 
insurance, the switch to state insurance explains 104.9 percent of the difference in the predicted 
yes-no spreads for 1920 and  1924. 
31. Similarly, opposition to the propositions with state insurance was less in 1922 than in  1924 
in part because the senatorial election of 1922 had substantially lower turnout than the presidential 
election in  1924. Decompositions suggest that 64 or 76 percent of  the difference in the yes-no 
spreads between 1922 and  1924 is attributable to the differences in voter turnout. 
32. The decomposition was similar to the one reported in note 30. We recalculated the predic- 
tions for the yes-no spread in  1920 using the turnout for 1926 and compared them to the predic- 
tions for 1920 in table 8.5. An alternative decomposition using  1926 as the base year and using 
the turnout figures from 1920 suggests that  102.9 percent of  the  10.5-percentage-point difference 
in yes-no spreads is attributable to the difference in turnover. 288  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
nents of workers’ compensation, an analysis of the final roll call votes would 
mask how legislators responded  to particular  features  of the proposed  bills. 
Fortunately, there were two important votes on amendments to bills that dealt 
exclusively with the two key issues we examined in the referenda voting: maxi- 
mum weekly benefits and state insurance. 
In 1919 Representative N. T. Cave proposed an amendment to house bill 79 
that would have raised the maximum  weekly death benefit from $18 to $21. 
The amendment  was  struck  down  47-75-1  7-3  (yes-no-absent-absent  with 
leave). The second vote was a proposed amendment to house bill 73 in  1921 
in which the house voted in favor (77-52-2-1  1) of Representative William P. 
Elmer’s proposal  mandating that employers insure through  a state insurance 
fund. The house’s amendment was tempered by a later senate amendment that 
allowed forms of private insurance, which the house subsequently adopted in 
the final 1921 act. 
We  estimated  logit equations for both  roll call votes  as a function  of  the 
legislator’s political party, occupation, and committee memberships. Pressures 
from his constituency are captured by the same county-level variables used in 
the referenda analysis, as well as  how his constituents voted  in the workers’ 
compensation  referendum in the following year (for the 1921 state insurance 
regression, we also included how constituents voted on the trial lawyers’ joker 
proposition #18). The marginal effects of a one-standard-deviation  change in 
each independent variable, holding all others at their sample means, are pre- 
sented in table 8.6. 
One major difference between  the referenda  and legislative voting is the 
influence of organized labor. In the referenda the rank-and-file supported state 
insurance but offered only lukewarm enthusiasm for higher benefits. Clearly, 
the Missouri unions wielded far more influence in the legislature than in the 
electorate. In the referenda union members were such a small part of the elec- 
torate that a one-standard-deviation increase in their percentage of voters could 
not shift the voting spreads by  more than 2 or 3 percentage points in favor of 
state insurance or higher benefit ceilings. In contrast a one-standard-deviation 
shift in  unionization increased the probability  that a legislator would vote in 
favor of  higher benefits by  32.8 percentage points and in favor of state insur- 
ance by  14.2 
Another key difference between the legislative voting and the referenda is 
in the strength of employers and small groups of highly productive workers or 
workers in dangerous industries. In the referenda analysis the average wages 
and risk variables both had very small impacts on the voting for workers’ com- 
pensation, primarily because the variables represent groups that were a small 
percentage of the electorate. In the legislative setting, however, the employer 
and worker groups were countervailing  influences. Workers in high-wage or 
risky jobs were likely to support higher benefits and state insurance, whereas 
their employers would have sought the opposite. The legislative voting, holding 
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Table 8.6  Marginal Probability Estimates of Voting for Higher Maximum 
Benefits and State Insurance Scheme: Missouri House, 1919 and 1921 
1919: Raising 
Maximum Benefits 
from $18 to $21  192  1 : State Insurance 
Mean  Marginal  Mean  Marginal 
Variables  (s.d.)  Effects  (s.d.)  Effects 
Estimated probability of voting yes at 
Personal Characteristics 
sample means 
Agriculture Committee member 
Commerce and Manufactories 
Committee member 
Life Insurance Committee member 






Description of Economic Coalitions 
% gainfully employed 
In agriculture 
In railroad work 




% population black 
Characteristics of political climate 
70  population illiterate 




0.113  -29.27 
(0.317) 
0.077  17.14 
(0.268) 
0.077  13.14 
(0.268) 
0.077  13.212 
(0.268) 
0.077  3.894 
(0.268) 




0.394  -37.19* 
0.338  -16.65 
43.81  I  19.63 
(25.552) 
(2.580) 
3.684  14.885 
(2.268) 
6.219  32.76* 
(6.922) 
856.742  5.982 
(21  1.264) 
3.425  -2.088 
(2.7 14) 
(4.405) 
3.279  -11.25 
4.140  -10.87 
4.360  7.695 
(2.818) 
14.321  11.376 
(6.716) 
0.113 
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from $18 to $2  I  1921: State Insurance 
Mean  Marginal  Mean  Marginal 
(7.d.)  Effects  (s.d.)  Effecta 
5%  voting yes on 1922 workers’ 
compensation proposition 
% voting yes on 1922 “joker” 
proposition 
N 
12.387  1.588 
(4.3  17) 
5.977  10.22*** 
(I  .853) 
122  129 
~~~  ~  ~ 
Sources; The 1919 roll call vote is from Missouri House 1919, 3-6,  74-76,  627, and legislator’s 
personal characteristics are from Missouri  Secretary of State 1919-20.  87-90.  The 1921 vote is 
from Missouri House 192  I, 3-6,  5 1-54.  63 1-32,  and legislator’s characteristics are from Missouri 
Secretary of State 1921-22,  79-81.  For all other variables, see table 8.3. 
Notes: Voting estimates were derived from a logit estimation. The estimated probabilities were 
computed by  setting each variable  at its  sample mean  and each of the  personal characteristic 
dummy variables  to zero. The marginal  effects reported here  reflect the change in the baseline 
probability  resulting  from  a one-standard-deviation change in  the  variable  under consideration 
(holding all  others constant at  their  means). The personal characteristic  marginals reflect  the 
change in the probabilities when the dummy variables change from zero to one. 
*Statistically significant at the  I  percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
were balanced on the two issues under consideration,  as the marginals of the 
average wage and risk measures are all statistically insignificant. 
A similar story might be told about the political role of railroad interests. In 
the referenda voting, where employers would have had little impact, railroad 
workers tended to support the MSFL‘s stated position on workers’ compensa- 
tion. In the legislature, however, where railroad employers were likely to exer- 
cise more influence, more railroad employment was associated with opposition 
to higher benefits and state insurance, two issues that the unions clearly sup- 
ported. Railroad employers were likely to oppose increased benefits because 
some of their workers were included under the Missouri legislation. Alterna- 
tively, if their workers were engaged in interstate commerce and thus not cov- 
ered by the law, then railroad employers might have opposed the amendment 
because higher benefits in other sectors may  have forced them to pay higher 
wages to attract workers. 
The difference in the legislative voting in  1919 and  1921 suggests that the 
introduction of the referendum after 19  19 led to a dramatic increase in strategic 
voting. In the 1919 vote on higher benefits, legislators had little reason to anti- 
cipate that workers’ compensation  would be subject to referenda;  therefore, 291  Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers’ Compensation 
they could vote as if they had the final word on the issue, subject to the approval 
of the governor. After the 1920 referenda the whole process had changed, and 
legislators could anticipate that the voters would again be the final arbiters on 
the status of workers’ compensation. The vote on state insurance in 192  1 be- 
came much more  of  a  strategic vote. Opponents of  workers’  compensation 
voted for state insurance to try to saddle the workers’ compensation bill with 
a feature that would have led it to its demise at the hands of the voters. Support- 
ers of workers’ compensation, on the other hand, had an incentive to scuttle 
the amendment. 
Since legislators tend to seek membership on committees in which they have 
an interest  (Shepsle  1978), we would  expect that members of  the Workers’ 
Compensation Committee were likely to push for the compensation law. These 
committee members, in fact, displayed strong, statistically significant opposi- 
tion to the state insurance floor amendment, which indicates that they consid- 
ered mandatory state insurance to be a potential spoiler. The referenda results 
indicated  that  Democratic  districts  tended  to  give  slightly  more  support  to 
workers’  compensation than  Republican  ones. The Democrats’  statistically 
significant opposition to state insurance is consistent with this finding. In fact, 
the disincentive to include state insurance in the workers’ compensation bill 
would have been obvious to anyone listening to the contemporary debate or 
who had rational expectations about the referenda voting, which clearly indi- 
cated the electorate’s opposition to state insurance. 
Opponents of workers’ compensation, alternatively, had a clear incentive to 
adopt the state insurance provision. The roll call analysis reveals that members 
of the Committee of Commerce and Manufactories, dominated by five farmers, 
strongly supported the state insurance amendment in 1921. The voting seems 
to have been an attempt at subversion because agricultural interests in the refer- 
enda voting opposed both state insurance and the general concept of workers’ 
compensation. Similarly, legislators were more likely to favor state insurance 
if their constituents supported the damage-suit attorney’s joker proposition  18, 
which would have weakened an employer’s common law defenses and repealed 
the legislature’s 192  1 law. 
8.6  Conclusions 
Workers’ compensation laws across the United States were similar in that 
they all changed the liability rules governing workplace accident compensation 
and they shifted the burden  of insuring accident risk from workers onto em- 
ployers. Each state, however, enacted a unique set of rules to accomplish the 
same final objective. Workers’ compensation laws across the United States had 
varying levels of accident benefits, covered different injuries, excluded differ- 
ent industries, resolved conflicts differently, and provided a distinct means of 
insuring within the system. The Missouri example shows that these features of 
the law are what determined the types of  coalitions that formed to support or 292  Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V.  Fishback 
oppose the law.  How the  laws were  written  also determined how  quickly  a 
majority coalition could be assembled for final enactment of the legislation. 
The interest groups with the greatest stake in workers’ compensation sup- 
ported the general idea, but actively opposed specific features that were con- 
trary to their interests. Most employers supported workers’ compensation as 
long as there were limits on the benefits they would have to pay out. Alterna- 
tively, skilled and unionized  workers sought higher benefit  levels. Insurance 
companies saw workers’ compensation as an opportunity to expand their cov- 
erage of workplace accident insurance, but bitterly opposed the introduction 
of state insurance. In Missouri voters and agricultural interests also joined the 
opposition to state insurance. Interest groups in each state, therefore,  had to 
piece together a political compromise in order to enact workers’ compensation, 
and the result is substantial variation in the laws across the states. Based on the 
Missouri case study, we might speculate that in states with stronger and more 
unified unions, benefits were more generous, while in states with a weak insur- 
ance industry lobby, state insurance was more likely. 
The history  of workers’ compensation in Missouri  also demonstrates that 
uniform support among even narrow interest groups cannot be assumed. Many 
scholars have used the statements of union leaders to represent the views of all 
workers on the compensation issue. Close examination of the Missouri experi- 
ence suggests that workers varied in their support of the legislation based on 
their union status, skill, and the riskiness of their jobs. Further, rank-and-file 
union members did not always vote in support of their leaders.i3 The split be- 
tween the major union groups in Missouri illustrates that interest groups com- 
pare bills not only with the status quo, but also with possible alternatives. The 
SLBTC, for example, sometimes opposed workers’  compensation laws that 
may have improved on the status quo because it incorrectly anticipated that a 
law more beneficial to its members was easily within reach.34  The split between 
Missouri’s labor groups contributed to the state’s delay in adopting workers’ 
compensation and may have stymied their attempts to get written into the law 
the provisions that benefited  them most,  such as higher benefit  levels. Mis- 
souri’s unions’  failure to  coordinate  successfully contrasts with New  York’s 
experience in which unions were strong and unified and were able to negotiate 
relatively high accident compensation and a form of state insurance (Wesser 
1971). 
Even if agreements were reached within and across interest groups, the po- 
litical negotiations over workers’ compensation in Missouri were further com- 
plicated when the referendum process required interest groups within the ma- 
jority legislative coalition to consider the interests of those outside the coalition 
and the electorate as a whole. Missouri voters, for example, were adamantly 
33. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) make a similar point about differences in the leaders’ and 
34. Castrovinci (1976) finds that some Illinois unions behaved similarly. 
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opposed to the  state  insurance  component  of  workers’  compensation. Al- 
though Missouri  labor unions  strongly  supported  state insurance and might 
have been able to write the provision into law at the legislative level, as long 
as the median Missouri voter was against it, the unions were forced into com- 
promise. 
The Missouri case offers especially valuable insights into the impact of po- 
litical  institutions  on  the development  of  regulation.  Once legislators  could 
anticipate that a referendum was likely, opportunities increased for voting stra- 
tegically. Opponents tried to weigh legislative acts down with amendments that 
would have made the workers’ compensation proposals less palatable to voters. 
The increased  use of the referendum  and petition  in modern  times suggests 
that analyses of legislative voting, at least at the state level, are less likely to 
show the true interests of constituents on key aspects of legislation. 
When  political  decisions  are placed  in the hands  of  voters,  building  and 
sustaining winning coalitions  becomes  more difficult. A large proportion  of 
the Missouri electorate had little stake in workers’ compensation because as 
workers they were not covered by  the lcgislation  or did not face significant 
accident risk in the workplace. Further, many of the voters who were not di- 
rectly affected by workers’ compensation in their own personal economic cal- 
culations may have voted against it in the referenda because they were uncer- 
tain as to how the complex propositions  would have changed the status quo. 
Some may have feared higher personal costs, possibly in the form of lost jobs 
or higher taxes. Such voters may not have cared enough to make a specific trip 
to the polls to vote down workers’ compensation, but would have voted against 
it if they were already  at the polls voting on other issues. In  fact, workers’ 
compensation stood a greater chance of defeat during presidential  elections, 
when voter turnout was highest. 
A detailed analysis of how workers’ compensation was adopted in Missouri 
suggests that agricultural interests played a more important role in the develop- 
ment of workers’ compensation than previously thought. In nearly every state, 
supporters of workers’ compensation  tried to limit the opposition of  agricul- 
tural interests by excluding agricultural workers from coverage. Even then, ag- 
ricultural counties in Missouri opposed workers’ compensation, and legislators 
representing agricultural interests tried to lower the odds of passing workers’ 
compensation at the legislative and referenda levels by attaching amendments 
that would increase opposition to the bills. This pattern of agricultural opposi- 
tion extends to other states as well, as recent empirical studies of the adoption 
of workers’ compensation show that agricultural  states were slower to adopt 
the legislation (Pavalko 1989; Fishback and Kantor 1991). Agricultural voters 
had little to gain from the legislation, and were obviously concerned about the 
potential effects of radical legal reform. 
The political process of adopting workers’ compensation in Missouri offers 
an ironic lesson for progressive reformers.  The Progressives supported both 
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1900s. In many states the legislatures passed workers’ compensation laws at 
about the same time they expanded the role of  the referendum (Ranney 1978, 
70). Had the passage of workers’ compensation laws followed the expansion 
of the referendum,  as it did in Missouri, workers’ compensation laws across 
the United States might have taken a much different  form. Progressives be- 
lieved that, by  involving ordinary voters in the political decision-making pro- 
cess, regulations would better reflect the interests of those people with a direct 
stake in the  outcome. But complex  laws like  workers’  compensation often 
faced opposition  in the electorate  because the proposed  changes were  great 
and voters had little information with which to form expectations. In addition, 
the referendum process provided opponents of legislation with the opportunity 
to veto laws that were inimical to their interests. Strong opponents of the legis- 
lation who lost in the legislature, like the damage-suit attorneys and SLBTC in 
Missouri, succeeded in forcing the issue to a popular vote. Because a relatively 
large proportion of  the voting population had little stake in the outcome and 
had  concerns  about  the  new  law’s  potential  economic  effects, regulatory 
change was slowed. The more extreme components of  the  legislation,  such 
as generous benefits,  state insurance, or an expanded bureaucracy, had to be 
weakened or eliminated in order to win voters’ support. The Progressives’ push 
for broader voter representation might have undermined some of  the key eco- 
nomic reforms they sought. 
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